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Based upon evidence that vision for action has quicker access to visual informa-
tion than vision for perception, we hypothesized that the two systems may have 
differentiated visual thresholds. There is also evidence that, unlike vision for 
perception, vision for action is insensitive to cognitive dual-task interference. 
Using visual masking, we determined the visual thresholds of 15 participants in a 
perception task, an action task and an action plus concurrent cognitive secondary 
task. There was no difference in threshold between the perception task and the 
action task, but the action plus concurrent secondary task was accompanied by a 
greater visual threshold than both the perception task and the action task alone, 
indicating dual-task interference. The action task was thus most likely informed 
by vision for perception. The implications of these results are reviewed in the 
context of recent discussions of the two visual systems model.
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On the basis of findings in neuropsychology, neuroscience, comparative biol-
ogy and experimental psychology, Milner and Goodale (1995; 2008; Goodale & 
Milner, 1992) have developed an influential account of primate vision in which a 
functional dissociation exists between two distinct visual systems; one that medi-
ates the perception of objects and informs the planning of actions toward objects 
(i.e., vision for perception) and one that mediates the visuomotor control of actions 
directed at those objects (i.e., vision for action). Anatomically, this distinction is 
mapped onto respectively the ventral stream, projecting from the primary visual 
cortex (area V1) to the inferotemporal cortex, and the dorsal stream, projecting 
from area V1 to the posterior parietal cortex.
One corollary of the functional division between vision for perception and 
vision for action is that differences might exist in the speed with which the two 
visual systems pick up visual information to perform their tasks. Perception serves 
to obtain knowledge about durable and relatively static object properties such as 
their identity, meaning, and relative metrics in relation to surrounding objects. By 
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contrast, there is hardly ever a truly static relationship between observers and their 
goal objects, making the absolute metrics of a goal object in relation to an observer 
usually transient in nature (Goodale, Westwood, & Milner, 2004). Consequently, 
vision for action requires fast and continuous (i.e., real-time) access to visual infor-
mation whereas vision for perception does not have such stringent time constraints. 
An experiment by Pisella, Arzi, and Rossetti (1998; see also Veerman, Brenner, & 
Smeets, 2008), supports this proposition. Participants performed reach movements 
toward stimuli that could be perturbed in either location or color during the ongo-
ing movement. In case of a perturbation, participants were required to stop their 
movement. Results showed that stop-responses to perturbations of color, an object 
property that is arguably picked up by vision for perception, were obtained about 
80 ms later than stop-responses to location change, which are arguably mediated 
by vision for action (Rossetti, Pisella, & Pélisson, 2000).
Yet, ongoing controversy exists with respect to the tenability of the two visual 
systems model. It has been argued that in many cases psychophysical dissociations 
between vision for perception and vision for action are equally attributable to con-
founding task related factors and that an account of vision in which a single visual 
system guides both perception and action is just as appropriate (see for example 
Bruno & Franz, 2009; Smeets & Brenner, 2006). The dispute over the interpretation 
of the psychophysical literature arguably stems in part from the fact that, in normal 
human observers, “there is no such thing as a purely ‘visuomotor task’ nor a pure 
‘perceptual task’. Even when we perform an apparently simple task like reaching 
or grasping, we cannot help but simultaneously perceive the goal object.” (Milner 
& Goodale, 2008, p. 776, see also Enns & Liu, 2009; van der Kamp, Rivas, van 
Doorn & Savelsbergh, 2008). For this reason, it is very difficult to make convincing 
claims about whether observed effects are a function of either vision for percep-
tion, vision for action, or a combination of both. However, the distinct temporal 
properties associated with vision for action and vision for perception may allow 
vision for action to operate independently, without confounding contributions from 
vision for perception. Specifically, the observation that vision for action has quicker 
access to visual information than vision for perception (e.g., Pisella et al., 1998; 
Rossetti et al., 2000; Veerman et al., 2008) may entail that vision for perception 
and vision for action maintain their functionality at different minimum stimulus 
exposure times. Consequently, two distinct visual thresholds may exist; one that 
accompanies perceptual responses and one that accompanies action responses.
The current experiment was designed to test this hypothesis. Using a visual 
masking technique, we established the visual threshold of observers engaged 
in two action tasks and a perception task. In each task, goal targets consisted of 
tachistoscopically presented stimuli. In the perception task, participants were 
required to verbally indicate the location of the masked stimulus. In one action 
task, participants were required to perform a pointing movement on the basis of the 
location of the tachistoscopically presented masked stimulus. This action task was 
expected to have a lower visual threshold than the perception task; however, pilot 
work indicated that pointing movements often appeared to be based on a preceding 
conscious decision about perceived target location, so to prevent participants from 
using this strategy, a third condition was included in which the action task was 
accompanied by a concurrent cognitive secondary task requirement. Liu, Chua, 
and Enns (2008) found that a secondary task requiring central letter identification 
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interfered with identification of a letter that was presented peripherally but not 
with the accuracy or movement time of rapid pointing movements directed at the 
same peripheral target. In a related experiment, Creem and Proffitt (2001; see also 
Singhal, Culham, Chinellato, & Goodale, 2007) found that planning to correctly 
grasp tools in a way appropriate for their use (a component of action that is medi-
ated by vision for perception) showed interference from a secondary task requiring 
cued recall of previously learned word pairs while the visuomotor control of grasps 
did not. These findings imply that vision for action, but not vision for perception, 
is insensitive to cognitive dual-task interference. They also imply that a cognitive 
secondary task requirement can reduce contributions from vision for perception to 
an action task. Cognitive secondary task requirements therefore potentially could 
be used to assess the extent to which an action task relies on contributions from 
vision for perception and vision for action. That is, if performance in an action 
task is susceptible to dual-task interference, this suggests that the task is dependent 
on a significant contribution from vision for perception. We hypothesized that a 
cognitive secondary task requirement would minimize contributions from vision 
for perception to our action task, allowing vision for action to operate largely inde-
pendent from vision for perception, and thus that our action plus secondary task 
would display a threshold that was equal to- or lower than the action task alone 
(or the perception task)1.
Methods
Participants
Fifteen right-handed participants (6 females) aged 21–36 years (mean age 23) with 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision participated in the experiment. They were 
naïve with regard to the purpose of the experiment and were treated in accordance 
with the local institution’s (University of Hong Kong) ethical guidelines.
Apparatus
Target stimuli were presented in a 3-field tachistoscope (Electronic Developments, 
Middlesex, Great Britain) and consisted of filled black circles that could be located 
in one of four possible positions; right, left, top or bottom (see Figure 1a). During 
the experiment, room illumination was dimmed and both the participant and the 
tachistoscope were covered by a blackout cloth. Chair height was adjusted to ensure 
that participants were in a comfortable position when looking into the tachistoscope.
Procedure and Design
Participants performed an action task, an action task concurrently with a cognitive 
secondary task and a perception task in counterbalanced order in three separate 
sessions. In the action task, participants were instructed to rest the index finger 
of their right hand on a starting position directly underneath the stimuli that were 
presented in the tachistoscope (approximately 40 cm). At the start of the trial, the 
experimenter manually operated a switch to initiate presentation of a fixation cross 
for 1500 ms directly followed by a target stimulus, the offset of which concurred 
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with the onset of a pattern mask for 500 ms (see Figure 1a). Participants were 
instructed to: “make a pointing movement that indicates the position of the filled 
black circle” (see Figure 1b). Pointing movements could thus be made in four 
directions: top, bottom, left, right. In the action plus concurrent secondary task, 
participants performed the action task while simultaneously performing a cogni-
tive secondary task, which consisted of counting backward from 1001 by steps 
of three (i.e., 998, 995, 992, 899 etc.). Participants were required to start count-
ing approximately 5 s before the experimenter initiated the trial and to continue 
counting until after completion of the pointing movement. In each subsequent trial, 
participants continued counting from where they had stopped after the last trial. 
The experimenter monitored the counting performance and repeated the counting 
instructions if necessary. In the perception task, participants were instructed to 
verbally indicate the position of the filled black circle by saying: “top”, “bottom”, 
“left” or “right”. In each task, participants were instructed to respond as fast and 
accurately as possible following the onset of the target stimulus. This instruction 
was repeated after every six trials.
The visual threshold was determined for each participant in each task using 
an adapted version of Cheesman and Merikle’s (1984) hunting procedure in which 
the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between target and mask was reduced on 
the basis of discrimination performance2. Forced choice responses were required. 
Target stimuli were presented in blocks of 12 trials in the first three blocks (SOA’s 
of 100, 75 and 50 ms), and thereafter in blocks of 24 trials (starting from a SOA 
of 30 ms), with each of the four locations presented randomly on 6 occasions. The 
SOA was reduced incrementally after each block of trials by entering the number 
of correct responses in a Z-score proportions test (see Equation 1, where c is the 
number of correct responses).
Figure 1 — a. Schematic representation of stimulus presentation in the tachistoscope. b. 
Participant performing a pointing movement underneath the tachistoscope.
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The critical Z-value for α = .05 lies between 1.64 and 1.65. A Z-score less than 
1.65 was therefore interpreted as an indication that the participant was performing 
at chance levels. For a Z-score of 3.77 or higher the SOA was reduced by 5 ms and 
for Z-scores between 2.83–3.77 and 1.65–2.83, the SOA was reduced by 2 ms and 1 
ms respectively. When performance fell to chance levels a further block of 24 trials 
was performed to confirm that the visual threshold was reached at that SOA. On 
average, visual threshold determination was completed in approximately 45 min.
Statistical Analysis
To assess differences between conditions, the visual thresholds in milliseconds 
were submitted to a one-factor ANOVA with repeated measures. Paired T-tests 
were used for post hoc comparisons of means.
Results
Three male participants were excluded from the analysis because of difficulties 
in establishing their visual threshold in one or more conditions. The analysis was 
performed on the remaining 12 participants.
The ANOVA indicated a significant main effect of condition (F(2, 9) = 8.89, 
p < .01). Post hoc analysis showed that the action plus concurrent secondary task 
displayed a significantly higher visual threshold (23.13 ms, SD = 11.1) than both 
the perception task (17.21 ms, SD = 7.3) and the action task (17.29 ms, SD = 6.6). 
There was no difference in threshold between the perception task and the action 
task (see Figure 2).
Discussion
This study was designed to examine whether, for functional reasons, the visual 
threshold of observers engaged in an action task is lower than the visual threshold 
of observers engaged in a perception task. An action task and a perception task were 
compared, along with an action task combined with a concurrent cognitive second-
ary task that was designed to minimize contributions from vision for perception 
to the action task. The results are not consistent with our hypotheses; there was no 
difference between the threshold for the perception task and the action task, and 
rather than a lower threshold, we found a significantly higher threshold when the 
action task was accompanied by a secondary task. These findings may imply that 
vision for perception and vision for action have equal visual thresholds and that 
reducing contributions from vision for perception to an action raises the vision for 
action threshold rather than lowers it.
However, in the context of recent discussions of the two visual systems 
model, an alternative interpretation surfaces. The profound increase in visual 
threshold when the action task was accompanied by a secondary task indicates 
that the action task was sensitive to dual-task interference, suggesting that its 
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execution necessarily required contributions from vision for perception (Creem 
& Proffitt, 2001; Liu et al., 2008; Singhal et al., 2007). This explanation is fur-
ther supported by the fact that there was no difference in threshold between the 
perception task and the action task alone. Together with the dual-task interference 
in the action plus concurrent secondary task, this suggests that the perception and 
the action task were informed by the same underlying mechanism (i.e., vision 
for perception)3. Notably, Kunde, Landgraf, Paelecke, and Kiesel (2007) report 
a comparable effect of dual-task interference on reaction times (RT) in a closed-
loop grasping task and a perceptual judgment task (e.g., manual matching) and 
conclude that vision for action and vision for perception are both affected by 
dual-task interference. However, because manual RT’s precede movement, they 
are arguably reflective of action planning (e.g., identification of target location, 
selection of an action mode), which is a component of action that appears to 
be mediated by vision for perception and might therefore be expected to show 
comparable cognitive dual-task interference (Enns & Liu, 2009). Importantly, 
the dependent measure of the action tasks in the current experiment may also be 
interpreted as being reflective of action planning (e.g., “Where should I point”?). 
In this context, our results would provide additional evidence for the notion that 
by informing action planning, vision for perception plays an important role in 
action (e.g., Milner & Goodale, 2008; van der Kamp, Rivas, van Doorn & Sav-
elsbergh, 2008; van der Kamp, van Doorn, & Masters, 2009; van Doorn van der 
Kamp, & Savelsbergh, 2007; van Doorn, van der Kamp, de Wit, & Savelsbergh, 
2009).
Figure 2 — thresholds (in ms) for the three tasks, * indicates a significant difference at α 
= .05, error bars represent 1 SD.
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In contrast with our results, effects of fully masked (i.e., verbally indiscrim-
inable) primes on the RT’s of button presses in response to the onset of masks have 
been frequently reported (e.g., Klotz & Neumann, 1999; Schlaghecken, Blagrove, 
& Maylor, 2008; Taylor & McCloskey, 1996). This prompts the question of why, 
unlike our study, these studies did find differences in visual threshold between 
motoric and verbal response modes, even though in these studies, as in ours, both 
the motoric and the verbal responses were likely mediated by vision for perception. 
The answer might be related to differences in the nature of the response modes used 
in these studies and in ours. Clearly, verbal discrimination requires a conscious 
decision (e.g., one needs to answer the question: “Where did I see the target”?). 
In contrast, pressing a button in response to the onset of a stimulus may place less 
emphasis on making a conscious decision. Moreover, because of its continuous 
scale, RT is a more sensitive dependent measure than a discrete verbal response, 
which makes it relatively easier to detect differences between responses when they 
are present. From this point of view, the lack of a difference in threshold between 
the action task alone and the perception task in our experiment may have been due 
to the fact that not only the perception task, but also the action task had a depen-
dent measure that emphasized making a conscious decision (e.g., “Where should 
I point”?), and consisted of a discrete response. The increment in threshold for the 
action plus concurrent secondary task further supports this interpretation. That is, 
if the action task had not required a conscious decision, then this task would not 
have been subject to cognitive dual-task interference.
If our action measure was not chiefly informed by vision for action, the question 
of whether vision for action has a lower visual threshold than vision for perception 
remains unanswered. However, a study by Heath, Neely, Yakimishyn, and Binsted 
(2008; Binsted, Brownell, Vorontsova, Heath, & Saucier, 2007; Heath, Maraj, God-
bolt, & Binsted, 2008; and see Cressman, Franks, Enns, & Chua, 2007; Schmidt, 
2002 for related experiments) may illuminate the problem. Participants performed 
pointing movements toward masked targets of different sizes and although they 
were unable to verbally indicate the size of the masked targets at above chance 
levels, Fitts’ law (1954) was preserved (movements to smaller targets were slower). 
Visual masking may therefore be a useful tool for studying the functional properties 
of vision for action independently from vision for perception; however, to further 
examine the possibility that vision for action has a lower visual threshold than 
vision for perception, it is important to use an action task that engages vision for 
action (see also Enns & Liu, 2009). One way to validate such a task is to determine 
whether it is sensitive to cognitive dual-task interference.
Notes
1. Because dual-task interference would indicate reliance on contributions from vision for percep-
tion in the action task, and we were interested in comparing the visual thresholds of vision for 
action and vision for perception, it was deemed unnecessary to employ a full factorial design in 
which the perception task was also paired with a concurrent secondary task requirement.
2.  In this procedure, hunting is terminated at the SOA corresponding with chance level per-
formance. The procedure therefore does not allow determination of whether masking is type A 
(e.g., monotonic increase of performance at increasing SOA’s) or type B (e.g., U-shaped, with 
performance worst not at the lowest SOA but at intermediate SOA’s; see Breitmeyer & Ögˇ  men, 
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2006). This limitation potentially could confound threshold determination in our study; however, 
Schmidt (2002) established masking curves relating performance to SOA in a pointing task and 
a color identification task and showed type A performance for each of the measures. For this 
reason, we assume masking to be of type A in our tasks.
3. In the Introduction, we argued that by minimizing contributions from vision for perception, 
the secondary task requirement would lower the visual threshold of the action task, while here 
we argue that the secondary task increased the visual threshold. Thus, in both cases we view the 
secondary task as disruptive of vision for perception. We initially assumed that the action task 
would be guided by vision for action, and that disruption of vision for perception by a second-
ary task would leave only vision for action to inform task execution, resulting in a lower visual 
threshold. However, our data suggests that the action task was not guided by vision for action, but 
by vision for perception, which suffers from dual-task interference. Consequently, the secondary 
task requirement resulted in a higher visual threshold.
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